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ZONING LAW IN MICIDGAN AND NEW 
JERSEY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
Roger A. Cunningham* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
RECENT decades have been marked by a formidable expansion of land-use controls based upon the police power and upon other 
powers of state and local govemments.1 The most important form of 
land-use control under the police power is undoubtedly zoning, 
which is defined as follows by one of its leading early exponents: 
"Zoning is the regulation by districts of building develop-
ment and uses of property. A typical zoning ordinance divides 
the territory covered by the ordinance, usually the whole ter-
ritory of a single municipality, into districts, in each of which 
uniform regulations are provided for the uses of buildings 
and land, the height of buildings, and the area or bulk of build-
ings and open spaces. By use regulation is meant a statement of 
the permitted or prohibited uses of property and buildings, as, 
for instance, residential, business, and industrial. Use districts 
are often further sub-classified, as, for instance, residential dis-
tricts into those restricted to single-family houses and those in 
which multiple-family or apartment structures are permitted; 
business districts into central and local and those in which light 
manufacturing is permitted or excluded; industrial districts 
for light manufacturing, for heavy but non-nuisance types of 
industry, and nuisance or unrestricted districts. Height regula-
tions fix the height to which buildings or portions thereof may 
be carried. Area regulations fix the amount or percentage of the 
lot which may be occupied by a building or its various parts and 
the extent and location of open spaces, such as building setbacks, 
side yards, rear yards. The typical comprehensive ordinance in-
cludes all these types of regulations."2 
The concept of private property in land as a "bundle of sticks" 
comprising legal rights, powers, privileges, and immunities is now 
a familiar one.3 It is increasingly apparent that, by means of zoning, 
local governments have abstracted many of the "sticks" which for-
merly made up the "bundle" labelled "private property" and that 
these withdrawn "sticks" are now in public rather than private 
• Professor of Law, The University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1. See Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and Local Programs, 50 IowA L. 
REv. 367 (1965). 
2. BETIMAN, CITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING PAPERS 156, 158 (1946), reprinting Bett-
man's amicus curiae brief in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 265 (1926). 
3. See REsrATEMENT, PROPEl!.TY, ch. 1, Introductory Note, §§ 1-5 (1936). 
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hands. This process of abstraction may be viewed from various 
perspectives. As Professor Cribbet has recently pointed out, "The 
lawyer tends to see zoning as a restriction on the private property 
of his client, conflicting frequently with the views of property he 
learned in law school; the planner tends to see zoning as one weapon 
in the battle for a better society and the private landowner as a 
cantankerous individual who is always objecting about his rights and 
cares little for his duties."4 
Since the United States Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on 
the principle of zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,rs 
development of the law of zoning has been almost entirely the re-
~ponsibility of the several states. Some state courts, including those 
of New Jersey, have gone very far in recognizing the broad sweep 
of the "general welfare" component of the police power and in ac-
cording to local governments great latitude in using zoning to im-
plement comprehensive land-use plans designed to protect and pro-
mote the general welfare. Other state courts, including those of 
Michigan, have been very slow to extend the "general welfare" 
concept beyond protection of public health, safety, and morals 
and -have kept a tight rein upon local governmental exercise of the 
zoning power. Courts which fall into this group tend to assume the 
role of "super zoning commissions" as they exercise their power of 
judicial review. 
It is one thesis of this article that the "lawyer's view" has gen-
erally prevailed in Michigan and that the "planner's view" has gen-
erally prevailed in New Jersey. Since the zoning law of these two 
states is thus fairly representative of the opposing judicial attitudes 
set forth in the preceding paragraph, they are especially suitable 
for comparative study. This study begins with a look at the con-
stitutional bases and statutory provisions for zoning. It then pro-
ceeds to examine judicial attitudes toward zoning determinations 
in general and continues by focusing on specific current zoning prob-
lems. The conclusions to be drawn from these inquiries may have 
utility not only for Michigan and New Jersey, but also for other 
states concerned with problems of land use control. 
A. The Constitutional Basis of Zoning 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,6 decided in 1926, estab-
lished the general validity of comprehensive zoning regulation under 
4. Cribbet, Changing Concepts in the !Aw of Land Use, 50 IOWA L. REv. 245, 260 
(1965). 
5. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
6. Ibid. 
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the fourteenth amendment. The Court held that the provisions of 
the ordinance assailed by the plaintiff, which totally excluded certain 
uses from residential districts, were justifiable under the police 
power. The opinion relied mainly on the health and safety compon-
ents of the police power and the Court was clearly impressed by the 
analogy to nuisance law, concluding that in a one- or two-family 
residence district uses which might even be desirable in a different 
setting come close to being nuisances. 
With federal constitutional questions thus disposed of, Michigan 
and New Jersey attempted to eliminate any problems that might arise 
with their mm constitutions. In Michigan this was accomplished by 
a 1928 state supreme court decision7 which held that the 1921 Zoning 
Act8 was constitutional and that home rule cities were subject to the 
act.0 In New Jersey, since 1927,10 the state constitution itself has pro-
vided that the legislature may enact general laws enabling munici-
palities to adopt zoning ordinances.11 The constitutions of both states 
direct that all constitutional and statutory provisions concerning 
local governments shall be liberally construed.12 
B. The Statutory Basis of Zoning in Michigan and New Jersey 
The current New Jersey Zoning Act, 13 which applies to all mu-
nicipalities (including townships), is essentially the original 1928 
Zoning Act. New Jersey has no statutory provision for zoning at the 
county level. In Michigan, the current City and Village Zoning Act14 
has undergone no important changes since its adoption in 1921, but 
the zoning power was extended to counties in 192915 and to unin-
7. Dawley v. Ingham Circuit Judge, 242 Mich. 247, 218 N.W. 766 (1928). 
8. Mich. Acts 1921, No. 107. 
9. The latter holding was reaffirmed in Krajenke Buick Sales v. Hamtramck. City 
Eng'r, 322 Mich. 250, 33 N.W.2d 781 (1948). 
10. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 6, ,I 5 (1927). 
11. "The Legislature may enact general laws under which municipalities, other 
than counties, may adopt zoning ordinances limiting and restricting to specified dis-
tricts and regulating therein, buildings and structures, according to their construction, 
and the nature and extent of their use, and the nature and extent of the uses of 
land, and the exercise of such authority shall be deemed to be within the police power 
of the State." N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 6, ,r 2. The italicized phrase was added in 1947; 
otherwise, the language is the same as that of the 1927 amendment to the constitution 
of 1844. The addition of the italicized phrase made it clear that open land uses, as 
well as buildings and structures and their uses, could be regulated by zoning. In Garrou 
v. Teaneck Tryon Co., 11 N.J. 294, 94 A.2d 332 (1953), open land use regulations 
adopted prior to 1947 were held valid from the date of adoption. Cf. Lappas v. Board 
of Adjustment, 23 N.J. Super. 553, 93 A.2d 406 (App. Div. 1952). 
12. MICH. CONST. art. VII, § 34; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ,I 11. 
13. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55-30 through -51 (1940). 
14. MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 125.581-.590 (1948). 
15. Mich. Acts 1929, No. 79, formerly Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 5.2951-.2961. This enabling 
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corporated townships in 1937.16 Conflict between county and town-
ship zoning is precluded by a provision that no township having its 
own zoning ordinance shall be subject to a prior or subsequent 
county zoning ordinance.17 
The New Jersey Zoning Act authorizes any municipality, by 
ordinance, to "limit and restrict to specified districts and ... regulate 
therein buildings and structures according to their construction, 
and the nature and extent of their use, and the nature and extent 
of the uses of land," including regulation and restriction of "the 
height, number of stories, and sizes of buildings and other struc-
tures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the sizes of yards, 
courts, and other open spaces, the density of population, and the 
location and use and extent of use of buildings and structures and 
land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes."18 The basic 
grant of zoning power to Michigan cities and villages is substantially 
the same, although it is embodied in three separate sections19 au-
thorizing, respectively, regulation of "the location of trades and 
industries and . . . of buildings designed for specified uses," of 
"the height and bulk of buildings . . . and . . . the area of yards, 
courts, and other open spaces," and of "the maximum number of 
families which may be housed in dwellings hereafter erected or 
altered." Although it may be inferred that Michigan cities and vil-
lages are authorized to adopt three separate zoning ordinances, the 
usual practice has been to enact a single ordinance containing all 
the regulations. 
Both the Michigan and New Jersey enabling acts empower the 
local legislative body to divide the municipality into "districts 
of such number, shape, and area as may be deemed best suited to 
carry out the purposes" envisaged by the enabling acts.20 The New 
act was repealed by Mich. Acts 1943, No. 183, the current County Rural Zoning 
Enabling Act, MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 125.201-.232 (1948). 
16. Mich. Acts 1937, No. 302, formerly Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 5.2962(1)-(12). This 
enabling act was repealed by Mich. Acts 1943, No. 184, the current Township 
Rural Zoning Act. MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 125.271-.301 (1948). 
17. MICH. CoMP. LA.ws § 125.297 (Supp. 1961). 
18. N.J. R.Ev. STAT. § 40:55-30 (Supp. 1964). 
19. MICH. CoMP. LA.ws §§ 125.581-.583 (1948). 
20. Ibid.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-31 (Supp. 1964). Although this basic statutory 
grant of power seems to envisage the division of a municipality into more than one 
"district," it seems unlikely that the New Jersey courts will interpret the statutory grant 
of power so literally as to preclude, where reasonable, the inclusion of an entire 
municipality in a single zoning district. See Duffcon Concrete Prods. Co. v. Borough 
of Cresskill, I N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949), sustaining a zoning ordinance which 
substantially limited an entire municipality to residential use. In Michigan, however, 
it was recently held that the City and Village Zoning Act "does not authorize one-use 
zoning of an entire city or village." Although there need not be "any great or stated 
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Jersey Zoning Act broadly declares that all regulations "shall be uni-
form for each class or kind of buildings or other structures, or uses 
of land throughout each district, but the regulations in one district 
may differ from those in other districts."21 The Michigan City and 
Village Zoning Act contains similar provisions with respect to 
regulations limiting the height and bulk of buildings, determining 
the area of yards, courts, and other open spaces, and limiting the 
maximum number of families to be housed in dwellings;22 but there 
is no such provision with respect to regulations restricting the loca-
tion of trades and industries and buildings designed for specified 
uses.23 
In New Jersey, all zoning regulations must "be in accordance 
with a comprehensive plan and designed for one or more of the 
following purposes: to lessen congestion in the streets; secure safety 
from fire, flood, panic and other dangers; promote health, morals 
or the general welfare; provide adequate light and air; prevent the 
overcrowding of land or buildings; avoid undue concentration of 
population."24 Such regulations must also "be made with reason-
able consideration, among other things, to the character of the 
district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with 
a view of conserving the value of property and encouraging the most 
appropriate use of land throughout such municipality."25 The Mich-
igan City and Village Zoning Act includes similar provisions,26 
although the "plan" is not expressly required to be "comprehensive." 
The Michigan Township Rural Zoning Act27 and County Rural 
Zoning Act28 grant substantially the same powers to township boards 
and county boards of supervisors, respectively, along with some 
powers which seem especially appropriate for regulation of land use 
in rural areas. 29 
number of use districts," there must be more than one. Gundersen v. Village of 
Bingham Farms, 372 Mich. !152, 126 N.W.2d 715 (1964). 
21. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-!!l (Supp. 1964). 
22. MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 125.582-.58!! (1948). 
2!!. See MICH. COMP. LAws § 125.581 (1948). It might also be noted that § !! of the 
Home Rule Act, MICH. COMP. LAws § 117.4(i)(!!) (1948), contains the following pro-
vision: "[Each city may in its charter provide:] ••. For the establishment of districts 
or zones within which the use of land and structures, the height, the area, the size 
and location of buildings and required open spaces for light and ventilation of such 
buildings and the density of population may be regulated by ordinance. . • • Such 
regulations in 1 or more districts may differ from those in other districts .••• " 
24. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-!!2 (Supp. 1964). 
25. Ibid. 
26. MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 125.581-.58!! (1948). 
27. MICH. COMP. LAws § 125.271 (1948). 
28. MICH. COMP. LAws § 125.201 (Supp. 1961). 
29. E.g., to create districts within which "the use of land for agriculture, forestry, 
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II. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE ZONING POWER 
IN MICHIGAN AND NEW JERSEY 
A. The Police Power and the Test of Reasonableness 
The plaintiff's attack in Euclid30 was based on both the due pro-
cess and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, 
but the Court did not explicitly refer to either in sustaining the 
principle of zoning. Instead, it simply said that, since the Euclid 
zoning ordinance as a whole was not clearly arbitrary or unreason-
able or outside the police power and since the validity of the zon-
ing classification was fairly debatable, the legislative judgment 
must be accepted by the courts. But specific warning was given that, 
upon later review of particular zoning provisions as concretely ap-
plied, such provisions might be held invalid as clearly arbitrary or 
unreasonable. 
A year after Euclid the Supreme Court sustained a municipal 
setback ordinance in terms which clearly indicated that area restric-
tions in a zoning ordinance would be upheld if reasonable.31 And in 
Zahn v. Board of Public Works,82 the Court reiterated the rule that a 
zoning classification will not be held to violate the fourteenth 
amendment if the reasonableness of the zoning classification is "fairly 
debatable." But in Nectow v. City of Cambridge,33 decided the next 
year, a zoning regulation which placed a small part of plaintiff's 
land in a residential district was invalidated. The Court relied almost 
wholly upon the findings of the trial master that (1) no practical 
use could be made of the land in question because there would not 
be adequate return on any investment for development of the land, 
and (2) that the residential zoning would not promote the health, 
safety, convenience, and general welfare of the city's inhabitants. 
It is not clear whether the court would have held the zoning invalid 
on the basis of either finding alone. 
The Supreme Court thus seemed to have embarked on the 
course foreshadowed in Euclid: close supervision of the municipal 
zoning power in specific applications. In fact, however, after Nectow 
the Court retired from the zoning field. Since 1928 it has consis-
recreation, residence, industry, trade, soil conservation, water supply conservation and 
additional uses of land may be encouraged, regulated or prohibited." See notes 
27-28 supra. 
30. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
31. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927). 
32. 274 U.S. 325 (1927). 
33. See Johnson, Constitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAW &: CoNTEMP. 
PROB. 199 (1955). 
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tently refused to undertake detailed review of zoning cases-most re-
cently in dismissing the appeal in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. 
Los Angeles34 for lack of a substantial federal question, although the 
latter case squarely presented the constitutional issue whether a 
zoning ordinance which has "altogether destroyed the worth of 
valuable land by prohibiting the only economic use of which it is 
capable effects a taking of real property without compensation."35 
While the result was technically "on the merits," the real significance 
of Consolidated Rock Products is far from clear.36 At the very least, it 
would seem that the per curiam disposition casts doubt on the con-
tinued vitality of the "extent of the economic harm" test laid down 
by Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon31 to deter-
mine when regulation of the use of property amounts to an uncon-
stitutional deprivation-a test which the Supreme Court had pur-
ported to reaffirm only a short time before in Goldblatt v. Town of 
H empstead.38 
Without any continuing supervision by the United States Su-
preme Court, state courts have been forced to develop their own 
rules for determining the validity of zoning regulations. In general, 
they have attempted to apply the test suggested in Euclid: Is the regu-
lation clearly arbitrary or unreasonable, having no substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare? But state 
court opinions-including those of Michigan and New Jersey-fre-
quently fail to indicate clearly whether the court is applying a con-
stitutional or a statutory test or, if the test is constitutional, whether 
the decision is based on the state or federal constitution. In the 
case of New Jersey, however, it is clear that ordinarily only the 
fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution is involved 
when a zoning case is decided on constitutional grounds, since the 
34. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962), noted 
in 50 CALIF. L. REv. 896 (1962). 
35. Brief for Appellant, Jurisdictional Statement, p. 5. 
36. See discussion in Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 43-44 
(1964). 
37. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
38. 369 U.S. 590 (1962). The challenged ordinance prohibited mining below the 
water table and imposed an affirmative duty to refill any excavation presently below 
that level. Appellants owned a tract of land on which they had mined sand and gravel 
for more than twenty years. It was apparently conceded that the regulation completely 
destroyed the mining utility of the land, but the record did not show what value the 
land would have for other uses. Since the court found the record barren of any 
evidence of economic detriment as a result of the regulation, it was sustained; the 
court's extended discussion of the "taking" issue technically constituted mere dicta. 
See discussion of Goldblatt in Sax, supra note 36, at 42-43, concluding that the opinion 
"leaves some doubt whether the Court is following, or repudiating, the Holmesian 
doctrine." 
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New Jersey Constitution contains neither a due process nor an equal 
protection clause. The same is true with respect to Michigan zoning 
cases (at least prior to 1964) since the due process clause in the 
Michigan constitutions of 1908 and 1963 is clearly concerned only 
with procedural due process39 and an equal protection clause was 
included for the first time in the constitution of 1963.40 
A zoning regulation may, of course, be invalid simply because 
it is ultra vires;41 it may at the same time be invalid on constitutional 
grounds. Moreover, it is widely held that any unreasonable exercise 
of police power delegated to a municipality by enabling legislation 
is ultra vires.42 Thus it is easy to see why courts so frequently fail to 
indicate clearly whether a zoning regulation is invalid on statutory or 
on constitutional grounds, and why the Michigan court so often 
repeats the cliche that zoning must be reasonable and that "reason-
ableness becomes the test of its legality."43 But what does "reason-
able" mean as applied to zoning regulations? It is obvious that it 
includes several closely related, but distinguishable, tests of valid-
ity:44 
(I) Is the regulatign substantially related to legitimate police 
39. Both MICH. CONST. art. I, § 17, and MICH. CONST. art. II, § 16 (1908) contain 
the following provision: "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." 
40. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2 provides as follows: "No person shall be denied the equal 
protection of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or 
political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, 
race, color or national origin. • . ." 
41. See, e.g., Gundersen v. Village of Bingham Farms, 372 Mich. 532, 126 N.W.2d 
715 (1964); Rockhill v. Chesterfield Township, 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1956). It 
should be noted that forms of land use regulation not authorized by the New Jersey 
Zoning Act may nevertheless be valid under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48•2 (1940): "Any 
municipality may make, amend, repeal and enforce such other ordinances, regulations, 
rules and by-laws not contrary to the laws of this state or of the United States, as it 
may deem necessary and proper for the good government, order and protection of 
persons and property, and for the preservation of the public health, safety and welfare 
of the municipality and its inhabitants, and as may be necessary to carry into effect 
the powers and duties conferred and imposed by this subtitle, or by any law." See 
Morris County Land Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J. 539, 546 n.l, 
193 A.2d 232, 236 n.l (1963); L. P. Marron & Co. v. Mahwah Township, 39 N.J. 74, 
187 A.2d 593 (1963); Fred v. Old Tappan Borough, 10 N.J. 515, 92 A.2d 473 (1952); 
Wulster v. Borough of Upper Saddle River, 41 N.J. Super. 199, 124 A.2d 323 (App. 
Div. 1956), certification denied, 22 N.J. 268 (1956). 
42. See STASON & K.AUPER, CASES ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 123-24 n.4 (1959). 
43. See, e.g., McHugh v. City of Dearborn, 348 Mich. 311, 315, 83 N.W.2d 222, 
224 (1957); McGiverin v. City of Huntington Woods, 343 Mich. 413, 417, 72 N.W.2d 
105, 107 (1955); Redford Moving & Storage Co. v. City of Detroit, 336 Mich. 702, 707, 
58 N.W.2d 812, 813-14 (1953). 
44. Compare the analysis and discussion in Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitu-
tionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through 
Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1124-30 (1964). 
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power objectives, i.e., "public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare"? If not, the regulation is both ultra vires45 and a violation 
of due process, even though it may impose only slight restrictions on 
land use.46 When a zoning regulation is held invalid £or lack of 
a substantial relation to legitimate police power objectives, however, 
it usually is found to be confiscatory or discriminatory as well. 
(2) Is the regulation confiscatory? In New Jersey, a zoning regula-
tion will not be held confiscatory unless it practically destroys the 
value of the land in question by preventing any economic use of 
it;47 but, if the regulation is confiscatory in this sense, it appears to 
be irrelevant that it also bears a substantial relation to legitimate 
police power objectives.48 In many of the Michigan cases, the 
court uses the term "confiscatory" in the same strict sense.49 In other 
cases, however, the court has labelled zoning regulations as "con-
fiscatory" although it is clear that the land in question retained 
substantial value.50 In these cases, the Michigan court apparently 
uses the term "confiscatory" to mean that it believes the public bene-
fit to be derived from enforcement of the zoning regulation is 
outweighed by the economic loss to the landowner,51 although the 
court has consistently stated that "depreciation in value is not a defi-
nite yardstick by which to measure the reasonableness of a zoning 
ordinance."52 Moreover, the Michigan court has frequently in-
45. Mich. COMP. LAws §§ 125.581-.583 (1948); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-32 (Supp. 
1964). 
46. See, e.g., Comer v. City of Dearborn, 342 Mich. 471, 70 N.W.2d 813 (1955); 
Ratobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 118 A.2d 824 (1955). 
47. E.g., Morris County Land Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J. 539, 
193 A.2d 232 (1963); Glen Roel< Realty Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 80 N.J. Super. 79, 
192 A.2d 865 (App. Div. 1963). See also Ascione v. Union City, 77 N.J. Super. 542, 187 
A.2d 193 (App. Div. 1962). 
48. The classic case is Arveme Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 
587 (1938). But Consolidated Roel< Prods. Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P .2d 
342 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962), indicates that the "confiscation" issue 
will not be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court when the regulation arguably 
bears a substantial relation to police power objectives. For general discussion, see 1 
RATHKOI'F, ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 6 (3d ed. 1956). 
49. E.g., Alderton v. City of Saginaw, 367 Mich. 28, 116 N.W.2d 53 (1962); Burrell 
v. Midland, 365 Mich. 136, 111 N.W.2d 884 (1961); Schaefer v. East Detroit, 360 Mich. 
536, 104 N.W.2d 390 (1960); DeQuindre Dev. Co. v. Warren Township, 359 Mich. 634, 
103 N.W.2d 600 (1960). 
50. E.g., Smith v. Wood Creek Farms, 371 Mich. 127, 123 N.W.2d 210 (1963); 
Lincolnhol v. Village of Shoreham, 368 Mich. 225, 118 N.W.2d 289 (1962); Wenner v. 
City of Southfield, 365 Mich. 563, 113 N.W.2d 918 (1962). 
51. This is articulated in Pere Marquette R.R. v. Muskegon Township, 298 Mich. 
31, 36, 298 N.W. 393, 397 (1941). But see Consolidated Roel< Prods. Co. v. Los Angeles, 
57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962). 
52. This statement or its equivalent will be found in McGiverin v. City of 
Huntington Woods, 343 Mich. 413, 72 N.W .2d 105 (1955); Long v. City of Highland 
Park, 329 Mich. 146, 45 N.W.2d 10 (1949). 
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validated zoning regulations in cases where, in New Jersey, the 
proper remedy would have been a zoning variance. 53 
(3) Is the regulation discriminatory-i.e., does it arbitrarily im-
pose greater restrictions upon some landowners than upon others 
similarly situated? If it does, there is a denial of equal protection,54 
and there may also be a violation of the statutory requirement that 
zoning regulations "shall be made in accordance with a [ compre-
hensive] plan."55 In New Jersey, complaints based on alleged zoning 
discrimination have usually asserted that nearby land has been 
"spot zoned" for uses less restrictive-and more profitable-than 
the uses permitted to the plaintiffs. 56 In Michigan, on the other hand, 
zoning has rarely been attacked on the ground that it constitutes 
preferential "spot zoning."57 But many of the cases in which the 
plaintiff alleges the zoning is "confiscatory" with respect to his land 
also, of necessity, involve discrimination-e.g., when it is argued that 
all or much of the nearby land along a major highway is zoned for 
53. See, e.g., Oschin v. Redford Township, 315 Mich. 359, 24 N.W.2d 152 (1946). 
54. "The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment secures equality of 
right by forbidding arbitrary discrimination between persons similarly circumstanced. 
Classification is consistent with this principle if it be reasonably based in the public 
policy to be served." Schmidt v. Newark Bd. of Adjustment, 9 N.J. 405, 418, 88 A.2d 
607,613 (1952) (Heber, J.). 
55. MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 125.581-.583 (1948); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-32 (Supp. 1964). 
56. See Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954); 
Conlon v. Paterson Bd. of Pub. Works, 11 N.J. 363, 94 A.2d 660 (1953); Speakman v. Bo-
rough of No. Plainfield, 8 N.J. 250, 84 A.2d 715 (1951); Zaehring v. Long Beach Township, 
56 N.J. Super. 26, 151 A.2d 425 (L. Div. 1959); Cassinari v. Union City, I N.J. Super. 219, 
63 A.2d 891 (App. Div. 1949). Preferential "spot zoning" was held invalid in these cases. 
See also discussion in Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township, 24 N.J. 154, 172-74, 131 A.2d 
I, 10-11 (1957). The New Jersey cases all emphasize that preferential "spot zoning" is 
invalid unless it is "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" designed to further 
Zoning Act objectives; and that if it is not in accordance with such a plan, it is in 
effect "a special exception or variance, • • • thereby circumventing the board of 
adjustment to which it is committed by our Zoning Act ... the quasi-judicial duty of 
passing upon such matters, at least initially, in accordance with prescribed standards." 
Speakman v. Borough of No. Plainfield, supra, at 257, 84 A.2d at 718, quoted in Conlon 
v. Paterson Bd. of Pub. Works, supra. 
"Spot zoning" which is more restrictive than the zoning of surrounding land has also 
been held invalid in New Jersey, with more or less emphasis on the discriminatory 
character of the zoning. Zampieri v. River Vale Township, 29 N.J. 599, 152 A.2d 28 
(1959); Glen Rock Realty Co. v. Glen Rock Bd. of Adjustment, 80 N.J. Super. 79, 192 
A.2d 865 (App. Div. 1963). See also Ascione v. Union City, 77 N.J. Super. 542, 187 A.2d 
193 (App. Div. 1962). 
For discussion of "spot zoning," see I RATHKOPF, op. cit. supra note 48, ch. 26; 
Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and Local Programs, 50 IowA L. R.Ev. 367, 
397-99 (1965); Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
1154, 1166-70 (1955). 
The zoning classification may also be discriminatory and therefore invalid, although 
there is no "spot zoning" at all. See, e.g., Katobimar Realty Co. v. 1Nebster, 20 N.J. 114, 
118 A.2d 824 (1955) (exclusion of retail business from light industrial zone was 
arbitrary and discriminatory); Marie's Launderette v. City of Newark, 35 N.J. Super. 94, 
113 A.2d 190 (App. Div. 1955). 
57. It appears that the only case on point is Penning v. Owens, 340 Mich. 355, 65 
N.W.2d 831 (1954). 
May 1965] Zoning Law 1181 
commercial use, while plaintiff's land is restricted to residential 
use.58 
(4) Does the regulation really constitute a taking of 
private property for public use, which is necessarily a deprivation 
of property without due process unless just compensation is paid? 
By one view, of course, any zoning regulation which is confiscatory 
is also an unconstitutional taking.59 By another view, however, there 
is no taking unless the regulation is designed to produce com-
munity benefits rather than to prevent a use which would cause 
harm to the community by burdening it with external costs.60 And, 
by a third view generally similar to that last stated, there is a tak-
ing only "when an individual or limited group in society sustains a 
detriment to legally acquired existing economic values as a con-
sequence of government activity which enhances the economic 
value of some governmental enterprise."61 Under either of the 
latter two views, a confiscatory reduction in land value through 
zoning is not necessarily a taking;62 but there may be a taking even 
though the reduction in land value is not confiscatory.63 The New 
Jersey courts have clearly recognized taking as a separate ground 
for invalidating a zoning regulation;64 and it would seem that the 
Michigan court has also done so when inappropriate zoning has been 
used for the purpose of depressing land values in advance of con-
demnation. 65 
B. The Scope of Judicial Review in Zoning Cases 
As previously indicated, zoning regulations may be attacked 
on the ground ' that they are ultra vires, or on the ground that 
58. See, e.g., Schaefer v. City of E. Detroit, 360 Mich. 536, 104 N.W.2d 390 (1960). 
See also James S. Holden Co. v. Connor, 257 Mich. 580, 241 N.W. 915 (1932) (setbacks in 
zoning ordinance were invalid because "arbitrary, discriminatory, and without basis of 
general welfare"). 
59. This would be so under the view enunciated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
60. Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 CoLUM. L. REY. 
650 (1958). 
61. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 67 (1964). For other views, 
see Heyman &: Gilhool, supra note 44, at 1126-30; Sax, supra at 46-60. 
62. This may be the basis of Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 
2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962), which is criticized in 50 
CALIF. L. REV. 896 (1962), but is apparently approved by Sax, supra note 61, at 69. 
63. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), in which the extent of the 
damage was only a moderate proportion of the total value of the land. 
64. Morris County Land Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J. 539, 193 
A.2d 232 (1963); Yara Eng'r Corp. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A.2d 559 (Sup. 
Ct. 1945) (also ultra vires); City of Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super. 
136, 173 A.2d 785 (L. Div. 1961). 
65. See, e.g., Grand Trunk W.R.R. v. City of Detroit; 326 Mich. 387, 40 N.W.2d 195 
(1949). 
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they are violative of constitutional limitations upon the police 
power. Typically, the plaintiff alleges that the regulation is "arbitrary 
and unreasonable," without clearly separating statutory and consti-
tutional grounds of attack. But the presumption that an act of a legis-
lative body is a constitutional exercise of its legislative power is 
generally extended to municipal ordinances, including zoning ordi-
nances,66 and consequently the burden of proving the ordinance 
invalid is upon the person attacking it. 
Practically every Michigan67 and New Jersey case68 involving the 
validity of a zoning regulation contains a statement of the basic 
presumption that a zoning ordinance is valid. But the courts of 
the two states have often demonstrated a significantly different at-
titude toward this presumption and toward the scope of judicial 
review of zoning in general. 
Prior to 1949, the New Jersey courts took a rather dim view 
of zoning. With the adoption of a new constitution in 1947 and 
the creation of a new court system in 1948, however, there came 
a dramatic change in the judicial attitude. Relying heavily upon the 
1947 constitution's express direction that all constitutional and stat-
utory provisions concerning local governments shall be liberally 
construed in their favor,69 the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a 
series of landmark decisions between 1949 and 1958, gave its bless-
ing to an enormous expansion of the municipal zoning power.70 
Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township11 expressed the standard for 
judicial review which prevails today: 
"The zoning statute delegates legislative power to local 
government. The judiciary of course cannot exercise that power 
directly, nor indirectly by measuring the policy determination 
by a judge's private view. The wisdom of legislative action is 
66. See generally 1 RATHKOPF, op. cit. supra note 48, ch. 21. 
67. See, e.g., Padover v. Farmington Township, 132 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. 1965); 
Christine Bldg. Corp. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962); Burrell v. 
City of Midland, 365 Mich. 136, 111 N.W.2d 884 (1961); Fass v. City of Highland Park, 
321 Mich. 156, 32 N.W.2d 375 (1948). 
68. See, e.g., United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 
447 (1964); Vickers v. Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. 
denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963); Napierkowski v. Gloucester Township, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 
481 (1959); Oliva v. City of Garfield, 1 N.J. 184, 62 A.2d 673 (1948). 
69. N.J. CoNsr. art. IV, § 7, 1f 11. 
70. Fischer v. Bedminster Township, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952); Lionshcad 
Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952); Duffcon Concrete 
Prods. Co. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949). 
For a general discussion of the New Jersey decisions from 1948-59, see Cunningham, 
Control of Land Use in New Jersey by Means of Zoning, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 37, 42-48 
(1959). 
71. 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957). The case is discussed at length in Cunningham, 
Real Property, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 218, 246-50 (1957). 
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reviewable only at the polls. The judicial role is tightly circum-
scribed. We may act only if the presumption in favor of the 
ordinance is overcome by a clear showing that it is arbitrary or 
unreasonable."72 
Since Kozesnik, although the total volume of zoning litigation 
in the New Jersey courts has been large, relatively few zoning ordi-
nances have been challenged on substantive statutory or constitu-
tional grounds. Zoning ordinances attacked on such grounds have 
been upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court in ten cases78 and 
held invalid in only two.74 During the same period, in cases decided 
by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court and not reviewed 
by the Supreme Court, zoning regulations have been sustained in 
eight cases75 and invalidated in only three cases.76 
Prior to Brae Burn, Inc. v. City of Bloomfield Hills, decided in 
72. 24 N.J. at 161, 1!11 A.2d at 8. 
7!1. United Al:lvertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 
(1964); Morris v. Postma, 41 N.J. !154, 196 A.2d 792 (1964); Gruber v. Raritan Township, 
!19 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d 489 (1962); Hohl v. Readington Township, !17 N.J. 271, 181 A.2d 150 
(1962); Vickers v. Gloucester Township, !17 N.J. 2!12, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied, 
!171 U.S. 23!1 (196!1); Allendale Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Grosman, 30 
N.J. 27!1, 152 A.2d 569 (1959); Napierkowski v. Gloucester Township, 29 N.J. 481, 150 
A.2d 481 (1959); Ward v. Montgomery Township, 28 N.J. 529, 147 A.2d 248 (1959); 
Wollen v. Fort Lee, 27 N.J. 408, 142 A.2d 881 (1958); Fanale v. Hasbrouck Heights, 26 
N.J. !120, 1!19 A.2d 749 (1958); Bogert v. Washington Township, 25 N.J. 57, 135 A.2d 1 
(1957). 
See also Wilson v. Borough of Mountainside, 42 N.J. 426, 201 A.2d 540 (1964) 
(residential zoning held generally reasonable, though perhaps unreasonable as applied 
to highway frontage); Roman Catholic Diocese v. Ho-Ho-Kus Borough, 42 N.J. 556, 202 
A.2d 161 (1964) (private schools held subject to zoning power since public schools are 
subject thereto); Saint Cassian's Catholic Church v. Allen, 40 N.J. 46, 190 A.2d 667 
(196!1) (zoning regulations applicable to private schools were not discriminatory in fact). 
74. Morris County Land Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J. 539, 193 
A.2d 232 (1963); Zampieri v. River Vale Township, 29 N.J. 599, 152 A.2d 28 (1959). 
See also Shaw v. Wayne Township, 65 N.J. Super. 461, 168 A.2d 84 (App. Div. 1961), 
afj'd, 35 N.J. 595, 174 A.2d 474 (1961) (holding part of zoning amendment invalid, but 
separable from the rest, which was sustained). Recently, however, a dissenting minority 
of the supreme court vigorously asserted that the court has been exercising too much 
restraint in its review of zoning cases. Vickers v. Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 252, 
181 A.2d 129, 140 (1962) (dissenting opinion). The case is criticized in a note in 61 
MICH. L. REV. 1010 (196!1). Whether the Vickers dissent will have any effect on the 
majority's standards for judicial review remains to be seen. 
75. Borough of Northvale v. Blundo, 85 N.J. Super. 56, 203 A.2d 721 (App. Div. 
1964); Tidewater Oil Co. v. Mayor & Council, 84 N.J. Super. 525, 202 A.2d 865 (App. 
Div. 1964); LaRue v. East Brunswick, 68 N.J. Super. 435, 172 A.2d 691 (App. Div. 1961); 
Leonia v. Fort Lee, 56 N.J. Super. 135, 151 A.2d 540 (App. Div. 1959); Brundage v. 
Randolph Township, 54 N.J. Super. !184, 148 A.2d 841 (App. Div. 1959); L. P. Marron 
& Co. v. River Vale Township, 54 N.J. Super. 64, 148 A.2d 205 (App. Div. 1959); Finn 
v. Wayne Township, 53 N.J. Super. 405, 147 A.2d 563 (App. Div. 1959); Bartlett v. 
Middletown Township, 51 N.J. Super. 239, 143 A.2d 778 (App. Div. 1958). 
76. Glen Rock Realty Co. v. Glen Rock Bd. of Adjustment, 80 N.J. Super. 79, 192 
A.2d 865 (App. Div. 1963); Ascione v. Union City, 77 N.J. Super. 542, 187 A.2d 193 
(App. Div. 1962) (semble); Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh, 55 N.J. Super. 132, 150 
A.2d 6!1 (App. Div. 1959). 
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1957, the Michigan Supreme Court seems generally to have given 
little real weight to the presumption of validity, despite frequent 
lip service to it. Indeed, in some cases the court seems really to 
have placed upon the municipality the burden of proving that the 
challenged zoning regulation bore a substantial relation to the pub-
lic health, safety, or general welfare.77 Most of the cases were 
what one writer has called "·wrong district" cases; i.e., plaintiff 
claimed that his land was improperly classified and should have been 
included in a less restricted district.78 In a great majority of the cases, 
the plaintiff's challenge was successful.79 Although the court often 
said, particularly when it struck down a zoning regulation, that 
each case must be determined on its own facts and circumstances,80 
the basic ground on which zoning classifications were held invalid 
in most cases was that the zoning was confiscatory.81 In reaching such 
a conclusion, the court has emphasized both direct testimony (usu-
ally from real estate brokers) as to the reduction in value resulting 
from the zoning classification of the land in question82 and the sit-
uational factors which allegedly made the zoning unreasonable.83 
With the increase in zoning litigation in Michigan in the 1950's, 
it became increasingly clear that the court was giving weight to ex-
77. See, e.g., Clark v. Lyon Township, 348 Mich. 173, 82 N.W.2d 433 (1957); 
Industrial Land Co. v. City of Birmingham, 346 Mich. 667, 78 N.W.2d 656 (1956); 
McGiverin v. City of Huntington Woods, 343 Mich. 413, 72 N.W.2d 105 (1955). 
78. See Andrews, Whatever Happened to the Brae Burn Rule?, Mich. S.B.J., 
March 1964, pp. 34-35. See also the detailed analysis of Michigan zoning cases in the 
period 1949-57 in 9 Municipal League Briefs, No. 6, June 1958, reprinted in MICHIGAN 
MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, TECHNICAL TOPICS, No. 21 (1958). 
79. See 9 Municipal League Briefs, No. 6, supra note 78, indicating that during 
the period from 1949 until the decision of Brae Burn, Inc. v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 
350 Mich. 425, 86 N.W.2d 166 (1957), challenged zoning regulations were invalidated 
in twenty-nine cases and sustained in only nine. In twenty-six cases, the lower court 
held the zoning regulations invalid; in twenty-two of these, the Michigan Supreme 
Court affirmed and in four it reversed. In twelve cases, the lower court sustained the 
zoning regulation; in six of these, the supreme court affirmed and in six it reversed, but 
one of the affirmances was on other grounds, with an opinion indicating that four of 
the justices were doubtful of the validity of the zoning. In many of the cases in which 
zoning was invalidated, it would seem that the hardship to the plaintiff was unique and 
that a variance was the proper remedy. See case cited note 53 supra and accompanying 
text. 
80. See, e.g., Redford Moving &: Storage Co. v. City of Detroit, 336 Mich. 702, 58 
N.W.2d 812 (1953); Hitchman v. Oakland Township, 329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d 306 
(1951); Ritenour v. Dearborn Township, 326 Mich. 242, 40 N.W.2d 137 (1949). 
81. See authorities cited notes 49 and 50 supra. 
82. See authorities cited notes 49 and 50 supra. 
83. E.g., Spanich v. City of Livonia, 355 Mich. 252, 94 N.W .2d 62 (1959) (zone 
boundary cutting across the land in question); McHugh v. City of Dearborn, 348 Mich. 
311, 83 N.W.2d 222 (1957) (proximity of many incompatible land uses); Anderson v. 
City of Holland, 344 Mich. 706, 74 N.W.2d 894 (1956) (changes in the character of the 
neighborhood making the zoning classification inappropriate); Janesick v. City of 
Detroit, 337 Mich. 549, 60 N.W .2d 452 (1953) (lack of construction in the area over a 
substantial period of time). 
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actly the same factors local governing bodies should take into ac-
count when they enact a zoning ordinance. In short, the court was 
acting as a "super zoning commission," despite the fact that it was 
normally able to consider only one parcel of land at a time. Brae 
Burn, Inc. v. City of Bloomfield Hills84 marked an attempt to re-
examine and to limit the judicial function in reviewing zoning cases. 
In the course of the opinion the traditional rule that a zoning 
ordinance comes before the court "clothed with every presumption 
of validity" was vigorously reasserted. In addition, the reasons for 
limiting judicial review of zoning were stated as follows: 
"[T]his Court does not sit as a super-zoning commission. Our 
laws have wisely committed to the people of a community them-
selves the determination of their municipal destiny, the degree 
to which the industrial may have precedence over the residen-
tial, and the areas carved out of each to be devoted to commer-
cial pursuits. With the wisdom or lack of wisdom of the deter-
mination we are not concerned. 
* * * 
"This Court is not equipped to zone particular parcels of 
land. We do not see the land, we do not see the community, we 
do not grapple with its day-to-day problems. 
* * * 
"The function of the courts, with respect to these cases, 
lies largely in 2 broad areas: (a) has the legislative body the 
authority to act? (b) have the requirements of administrative 
due process been observed with respect to adoption, interpreta-
tion, and administration of the ordinance in question?"85 
Consistent application of the views thus stated would clearly 
bring the Michigan Supreme Court in line with the planner's view 
as to the proper scope of judicial review in zoning cases. At least 
eight decisions86 during the next four years clearly took this ap-
proach in sustaining zoning regulations. In three other cases87 de-
84. !150 Mich. 425, 86 N.W.2d 166 (1957). 
85. Id. at 430-31, 436-37, 86 N.W.2d at 169. 
86. Paka Corp. v. City of Jackson, !164 Mich. 122, no N.W.2d 620 (1961); Hungerford 
v. Dearborn Township, 362 Mich. 126, 106 N.W.2d 566 (1960); Patchak v. Lansing 
Township, 361 Mich. 489, 105 N.W.2d 406 (1960); Lamb v. City of Monroe, 358 Mich. 
1!16, 99 N.W.2d 566 (1959); McClain v. City of Hazel Park, !157 Mich. 459, 98 N.W.2d 
560 (1959); Uday v. City of Dearborn, 356 Mich. 542, 96 N.W.2d 775 (1959); Cook v. 
Bandeen, 356 Mich. 328, 96 N.W.2d 743 (1959); Roberts v. City of Three Rivers, 352 
Mich. 46!1, 90 N.W.2d 696 (1958). See also Spanich v. City of Livonia, 355 Mich. 252, 44 
N.W.2d 62 (1959), in which a unanimous court held the zoning classification invalid, 
even under the Brae Burn rule. 
87. Hoffer v. Fred L. Kircher Co., !163 Mich. !191, 109 N.W.2d 768 (1961); June v. City 
of Lincoln Park, 361 Mich. 95, 104 N.W.2d 792 (1960); West Bloomfield Township v. 
Chapman, 351 Mich. 606, 88 N.W.2d 377 (1958). 
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cided during the same period, the court sustained zoning regula-
tions without citing Brae Burn. But it also twice88 invalidated 
zoning regulations in cases where, although the majority believed 
its actions were consistent with Brae Burn, several justices, includ• 
ing the author of the Brae Burn opinion, contended that the ma-
jority had ignored the rule of that case. Since 1961, the court has 
held municipal zoning regulations invalid in eight of the twelve 
cases in which the validity of zoning regulations has been decided 
on the merits. 89 This does not, of course, mean that the eight cases 
were ·wrongly decided. But the court's approach to zoning cases 
from the latter part of 1961 until the early part of 1964 certainly 
supports the assertion that, while the court had not formally re-
nounced the Brae Burn rule, it had "either ignored it or completely 
misinterpreted it" during that period.90 
The recent decision in Padover v. Farmington Township91 clearly 
represents a swing back toward Brae Burn, although the multiplic-
ity of opinions in that case makes it difficult to ascertain the exact 
position of the majority of the court. In Padover, the court affirmed 
the lower court's judgment by a six-to-two vote, and opinions con-
curred in by four of the justices strongly reaffirmed the presumption 
of validity and the Brae Burn doctrine.92 
C. Zoning, Planning, and the [Comprehensive] Plan 
The relationship between zoning and planning is recognized in 
the zoning enabling legislation of both Michigan and New Jersey. 
The Michigan City and Village Zoning Act requires zoning regula-
tions to "be made in accordance with a plan designed to lessen con 
gestion on the public streets, to promote public health, safety and 
general welfare" and to "be made with reasonable consideration, 
88. Schaefer v. City of E. Detroit, 360 Mich. 536, 104 N.W .2d 390 (1960); DeQuindre 
Dev. Co. v. Warren Township, 359 Mich. 634, 103 N.W.2d 600 (1960). 
89. Invalid: Gundersen v. Village of Bingham Farms, 372 Mich. 352, 126 N.W.2d 
715 (1964); Smith v. Village of Wood Creek Farms, 371 Mich. 127, 123 N.W.2d 210 
(1963); Roll v. City of Troy, 370 Mich. 94, 120 N.W.2d 804 (1963); Lincolnhol v. 
Village of Shoreham, 368 Mich. 225, 118 N.W.2d 289 (1962); Christine Bldg. Corp. v. 
City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962); Alderton v. City of Saginaw, 367 
Mich. 28, 116 N.W.2d 53 (1962); Wenner v. Southfield Township, 365 Mich. 563, 113 
N.W.2d 918 (1962); Burrell v. City of Midland, 365 Mich. 136, Ill N.W.2d 884 (1961). 
Valid: Farmington Township v. Scott, 374 Mich. 536, 132 N.W.2d 607 (1965); 
Double I Dev. Co. v. Taylor Township, 372 Mich. 264, 125 N.W.2d 862 (1964); White 
Lake Township v. Amos, 371 Mich. 693, 124 N.W.2d 803 (1963). 
90. Andrews supra note 78, at 34, 37. But see Libby, Whatever Happened to the 
Theory of Reasonable Zoning?, Mich. S.B.J., May 1964, p. 10, for an answer to the 
Andrews article. 
91. 132 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. 1965). 
92. See the opinions of Adams, J., 132 N.W.2d at 692, and Otis Smith, J., 132 
N.W .2d at 696. 
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among other things, to the character of the district, its peculiar suita-
bility for particular uses, the conservation of property values and the 
general trend and character of building and population develop-
ment."93 The Michigan County Rural Zoning Act and Tovmship 
Rural Zoning Act contain similar provisions, 94 as does the New J er-
sey Zoning Act, 95 which, in addition, expressly states that the plan 
shall be comprehensive. But the exact nature of the required plan 
is not clear in either jurisdiction. 
Michigan courts have rarely referred to the statutory zoning 
plan requirement. In two cases in which the minimum lot-size 
regulations under attack were designed to carry out a comprehen-
sive zoning plan based upon a full-blown "master plan" of the 
type envisaged in the Michigan Municipal Planning Commission 
Act, 96 the lot-size regulations were held invalid primarily on the 
ground that it was unreasonable for the municipalities to plan so 
far ahead and to try to control the density of population by means 
of substantial lot minimums in the absence of a present direct 
threat to the public health, safety, and welfare.97 The decisions were 
supported by a line of cases beginning with Gust v. Canton Town-
ship,98 in which the court concluded its opinion with the statement 
that "The test of validity is not whether the [zoning] prohibition may 
at some time in the future bear a real and substantial relationship to 
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, but whether it 
does so now."99 
In Padover, however, at least four of the members of the court100 
clearly rejected the restrictive Gust formula.101 Since two other 
justices concurred in the result,1°2 it seems probable that a majority 
of the court is now prepared to view with favor zoning geared to 
future needs. 
Unlike the Michigan courts, the New Jersey courts have quite 
consistently recognized the close relationship between planning and 
zoning. In Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township,103 the New Jersey Su-
93. MICH. CoMP, LAws §§ 125-581-.582 (1948). See also MICH. CoMP. LAws § 125.583 
(1948). 
94. MICH. CoMJ.>. LAws §§ 125.273 (townships), 125.203 (counties) (1948). 
95, N.J. STAT, ANN.§ 40:55-32 (Supp. 1964). 
96. M1cH. CoMP. LAws §§ 125.31-.45 (1948). 
97. Roll v. City of Troy, 370 Mich. 94, 120 N.W.2d 804 (1963); Christine Bldg. Corp. 
v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W .2d 816 (1962). 
98. 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955). 
99. Id. at 442, 70 N.W.2d at 775. 
100. Justices Adams, Souris, Otis Smith, and Q'Hara. 
101. 132 N.W.2d at 697. 
102. Justices Kavanagh and Black. 
103. 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957). 
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preme Court asserted that, while zoning has in the main preceded 
municipal planning, zoning is properly an implementing tool of 
sound land use planning. And, in the recent cases of N apierkowski 
v. Gloucester Township104 and Vickers v. Gloucester Township,105 
the New Jersey court emphasized that zoning must subserve long-
range as well as immediate needs. Moreover, in the Vickers case, the 
court expressly disapproved the restrictive rule of Gust v. Canton 
Township. 106 
A few statements as to the nature of the comprehensive zoning 
plan in New Jersey may be made with confidence. The comprehen-
sive plan is not identical with the master plan provided for in the 
New Jersey Planning Act107 and it need not "exist in some physical 
form outside th.e ordinance," but may "readily be revealed in the 
end-product," the zoning ordinance.108 Moreover, the comprehen-
sive plan is to some extent a regional plan rather than just a munic-
ipal plan, for the New Jersey Supreme Court has expressly recog-
nized the extraterritorial impact of zoning.109 Beyond this, however, 
it would appear that the "comprehensive plan" requirement in New 
Jersey really means only that the zoning ordinance must meet the 
basic constitutional test of reasonableness. 
In general, the Michigan zoning plan requirement appears to 
be similar to the New Jersey comprehensive plan requirement; 
but it is less well defined and seems to have no regional overtones.110 
D. A Few Current Zoning Problems 
Several current problems on the frontiers of zoning illustrate 
particularly well the divergent attitudes of the two states selected 
for comparative study. If the uses of zoning involved in these areas 
are to be effective, a liberal (New Jersey type) judicial attitude is re-
quired. From these particular applications some conclusions hope-
fully may be drawn respecting the extent to which judicial inter-
ference in the zoning process is desirable. 
104. 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959). 
105. 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963). 
106. 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W .2d 772 (1955). 
107. Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957). The "master 
plan" is described in N.J. R.Ev. STAT. 40:55-1.10 to 1.12 (Supp. 1964). 
108. Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township, supra note 107. 
109. Duffcon Concrete Prods. Co. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 513-14, 64 
A.2d 347, 349-50 (1949). 
110. See generally Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 
U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1957); Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV, 
L. REv. 1154 (1955); Comment, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 161 (1963). 
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1. Total Exclusion of Uses From the Community 
Here, again, the Michigan Supreme Court seems much more in-
clined to circumscribe the municipal zoning power than the New 
Jersey Supreme Court. The New Jersey court has sustained a zoning 
ordinance which completely excluded industry from a small residen-
tial communitym and an ordinance which totally excluded trailer 
parks from a predominantly rural and largely undeveloped commu-
nity.112 In the latter instance, the majority relied heavily upon the 
presumption of validity applicable to all zoning ordinances, and con-
cluded as follows: 
"It must be remembered that once a use is legally established, 
even though conditions impel a revision of the zoning ordinance 
and the use strikes a jarring note, it cannot be eliminated by 
such a revision under existing law .... If through foresight a 
municipality is able to anticipate the adverse effects of partic-
ular uses and its resulting actions are reasonable, it should be 
permitted to develop without the burdens of such uses."113 
In Michigan, no zoning regulation which totally excludes a "law-
ful" land use has yet been sustained.114 But it would appear that 
total exclusion of some uses may be held valid if the municipality is 
largely developed and if the excluded uses would be incompatible 
with those already established.115 Indeed, the recent Padover decision 
may signal the adoption of a more permissive attitude toward total 
exclusion of some uses from largely undeveloped communities, 
although the case did not specifically deal with this problem.116 
2. "Noncumulative" Zoning and "Exclusive" Industrial Districts 
Most zoning ordinances enacted prior to the 1950's adopted the 
cumulative use zoning technique sustained in the Euclid case, ex-
cluding so-called "lower" uses (e.g., commercial and industrial uses) 
from "higher" use districts (e.g., single-family, two-family, and gen-
lll. Duffcon Concrete Prods. Co. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 
(1949). 
ll2. Vickers v. Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied, 
371 U.S. 233 (1963). 
ll3. Id. at 248-49, 181 A.2d at 138. 
114. E.g., Bzovi v. City of Livonia, 350 Mich. 489, 87 N.W.2d 110 (1957) (drive-in 
theatres); Smith v. Plymouth Township Bldg. Inspector, 346 Mich. 57, 77 N.W.2d 110 
(1956) (trailer parks); Gust v. Canton Township, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955) 
(trailer parks). 
115. June v. City of Lincoln Park, 361 Mich. 95, 104 N.W.2d 792 (1960) (substantially 
total exclusion of trailer parks from "city, with adjacent residential and industrial 
areas," valid). 
116. See text accompanying notes 91 &: 92 supra. 
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eral residence districts), but not excluding "higher" uses from 
"lower" use districts. Since World War II, however, local governing 
bodies have become increasingly conscious of the disadvantages 
which result from permitting the intrusion of residential land uses 
into areas where commercial and industrial uses are allowed and the 
advantages to be secured by the creation of exclusive industrial dis-
tricts.117 It is obvious, of course, that, if commercial and industrial 
uses have an adverse effect on residential neighborhoods, similar ad-
verse effects upon residential land uses will result from the intrusion 
of the latter into commercial or industrial districts. Moreover, there 
is reliable evidence that modern industry prefers to locate in areas 
zoned exclusively for industrial use.118 
Although the number of Michigan and New Jersey appellate de-
cisions involving noncumulative use zoning is still small, it is clear 
that the courts agree that "there is no rule of law, statutory or con-
stitutional, which ordains that any use has an exalted position in the 
zoning scheme entitling it to move everywhere as of right."1111 In 
Michigan, however, the supreme court has so far recognized only 
health and safety factors as a justification for exclusive industrial 
zoning,120 while the New Jersey courts have recognized that the zon-
ing power "may also be invoked to serve the public convenience and 
general prosperity and well-being" and hence that exclusive indus-
trial districts may properly be established for the purpose of attract-
ing industry and providing additional tax revenue to help support 
the expansion of necessary municipal services.121 Exclusive industrial 
zoning is clearly valid in New Jersey so long as it does not preclude 
all reasonable use of the land for an unreasonable length of time.122 
And there is no reason to doubt the validity of exclusive commer-
cial zoning, provided it meets the test of reasonableness. 
117. See Mott&: Wehrly, The Prohibition of Residential Developments in Industrial 
Districts, 1948 URBAN LAND INST. TECHNICAL BULL, No. 10. See also 1 R.ATHKOPF, 
ZONING AND PLANNING 14 n.6 (3d ed. 1957), for a list of cities that have ordinances 
creating "exclusive" nonresidential districts. 
118. See authorities cited note 117 supra. 
119. Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township, 24 N.J. 154, 169, 131 A.2d 1, 9 (1957). 
Accord, Lamb v. City of Monroe, 358 Mich. 136, 99 N.W.2d 566 (1959). 
120. Lamb v. City of Monroe, supra note 119. 
121. Gruber v. Raritan Township, 39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d 489 (1962); Ward v. Mont-
gomery Township, 28 N.J. 529, 147 A.2d 248 (1959); Kozesnik v. Montgomery Town-
ship, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d I (1957); Newark Milk &: Cream Co. v. Parsippany-Troy 
Hills Township, 47 N.J. Super. 306, 135 A.2d 682 (L. Div. 1957). See also Katobimar 
Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 129, 118 A.2d 824, 832 (1955) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
122. See Gruber v. Raritan Township, supra note 121; cf. Corthouts v. Town of 
Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112 (1953); Comer v. City of Dearborn, 342 Mich. 
471, 70 N.W.2d 813 (1955). 
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3. Minimum Lot-Size Requirements and "Acreage Zoning" 
In the early days of zoning, one of the principal devices for con-
trolling the intensity of land use in residential districts was the fix-
ing of a minimum lot size-usually five or six thousand square feet 
in single-family districts, with a minimum of fifty or sixty feet of 
street frontage. Coupled with these requirements, there frequently 
were requirements that the location of the principal structure should 
leave specified front, side, and rear yards open and that only a stated 
percentage of the lot might be occupied by structures.123 Restrictions 
of this type-which sometimes required that as much as seventy per 
cent of the lot should remain open-were clearly authorized by the 
zoning enabling acts124 and were not difficult to justify on health 
and safety grounds, since the required open space could be consid-
ered reasonably necessary to provide adequate light and air, to lessen 
congestion in the streets, to avoid undue concentration of popula-
tion, and to provide safe play areas for children. But the current 
practice of creating several single-family residence districts with a 
graduated scale of minimum lot-size and open space requirements 
is much more difficult to justify on health or safety grounds, particu-
larly when the top "minimums" go as high as three to five acres. It 
is arguable that substantial differentials in minimum lot-size require-
ments are prima facie discriminatory and that they raise a serious 
equal protection question.125 Yet a one-acre lot minimum covering a 
substantial part of a suburban community was sustained in Simon 
v. Town of Needham,126 the first appellate decision on the validity 
of "acreage zoning." The Massachusetts court did not indicate the 
minimum lot-size requirement in the other residence zone in Need-
ham, nor did it discuss the equal protection question. 
Despite the rather shaky legal foundation of Needham, many 
suburban and exurban communities have followed its lead and have 
established single-family residence districts with lot minimums as 
high as three to five acres. Surprisingly, the courts have generally 
been willing to sustain such "acreage zoning,"127 although few of the 
12!!. See HORACK & NOLAN, LAND UsE CONTROLS 138 (1955). 
124. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 125.582 (1948); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-30 (Supp. 1964). 
125. If the higher minimum lot-sizes make land development less profitable in some 
districts, the landowners may have an equal protection argument. But more significant 
is the discrimination against prospective purchasers who cannot afford to buy lots in 
the districts having the higher "minimums." 
126. 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942). 
127. See, e.g., Demars v. Zoning Comm'n, 142 Conn. 580, 115 A.2d 653 (1955) 
(40,000 square foot minimum valid); Honeck v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 257, 146 
N.E.2d 54 (1957) (five-acre minimum valid); Dilliard v. Village of No. Hills, 276 App. 
Div. 969, 94 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1950) (two-acre minimum upheld); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. 
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opm10ns have articulated a satisfactory justification for graduated 
minimum lot-size requirements or for the very high minimums ap-
proved in many cases. 
a. New Jersey 
The New Jersey courts have uniformly upheld m1mmum lot-
size requirements and have found no violation of equal protection 
in the usual graduated scale. In the leading case of Fischer v. Bed-
minister Township,128 an ordinance establishing a five-acre minimum 
throughout the greater portion of a rural community was sustained. 
Although a substantial minimum lot-size requirement was justifiable 
because of the lack of public sewerage and public water supply sys-
tems, it was clear that the primary purpose behind the five-acre min-
imum was to limit the growth of population and to obviate any need 
to supply urban services throughout the major portion of the com-
munity. But, despite the fact that the zoning ordinance was espe-
cially vulnerable to attack on the ground that it bore no reasonable 
relation to legitimate police power objectives and was discriminatory 
with respect to all persons who might wish to move into the com-
munity except those who could afford expensive homes, 129 the plain-
tiff failed to rebut the strong presumption of validity which attaches 
to zoning regulations in New Jersey.130 
In a later case involving a sizeable minimum lot-size require-
ment, 131 the confiscation argument was rejected and the discrimina-
tion argument seems to have been answ.ered, in part at least, by refer-
ence to a rather vague concept of community balance, as well as 
considerations of health, safety, and community attractiveness.182 
b. Michigan 
Until Padover the Michigan Supreme Court had invalidated 
minimum lot-size requirements in every case challenging their 
Easttown Township, 395 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958) (sliding scale of lot minimums from 
5,000 square feet to one acre was valid). But cf. DuPage v. Halkier, 1 Ill. 2d 491, 115 
N.E.2d 635 (1956) (two and one-half acre minimum invalid); Hitchman v. Oakland 
Township, 329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d 306 (1951) (three-acre minimum invalid); Board 
of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 N.E.2d 390 (1959) (two-acre minimum in-
valid). 
128. 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952). 
129. See Comment, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 292 (1957). 
130. Plaintiff's expert witness testified that "the township could have avoided any 
future health problems by a minimum plot size of 15,000 to 20,000 square feet," but he 
also testified that, because of the "extremely open character of the area" he considered 
ten acres, rather than five, a proper minimum in the "B" zone, and that he would have 
reduced the permissible number of half-acre lots to less than half of those provided in 
the ordinance! 
131. Clary v. Borough of Eatontown, 41 N.J. Super. 47, 124 A.2d 54 (App. Div. 
1956). 
132. Id. at 68, 124 A.2d at 64. 
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validity. The court, in effect, treated the minimum lot-size require-
ments as prima fade unreasonable and placed upon the municipality 
the burden of justifying them on health and safety grounds.133 In 
Padover, however, the court upheld minimum lot-size and frontage 
requirements based upon a zoning plan designed to create residen-
tial neighborhood units of thirty-five hundred to four thousand per-
sons. There was evidence (I) that such neighborhoods would support 
an elementary school of an ideal size and permit it to be placed in 
an ideal location, (2) that proper location of schools would result in 
safer conditions for children, and (3) that deviation from the plan 
might adversely affect the entire community. 
At minimum, Padover surely indicates a friendlier judicial atti-
tude toward minimum lot-size zoning in Michigan. Its emphasis on 
planning considerations is to be commended, as is the majority's rec-
ognition that the consequential loss to the developer from forced ad-
herence to relatively high lot-minimums must be placed in the con-
text of the value to the community of the comprehensive land-use 
plan. In short, Padover would seem to give some guaranty that com-
prehensive community planning in Michigan will no longer be "sub-
ject to destruction because a property viewed separately, even though 
it is an integral part of [the] whole, would create no immediate haz-
ard to health and welfare if developed with . . . minimum lot sizes 
[smaller than required by the zoning ordinance]."134 But the Mich-
igan Supreme Court, like the New Jersey Supreme Court, has yet 
to face squarely the vexing problem of equal protection implicit in 
any graduated scale of minimum lot-size requirements. 
4. The Minimum-Size House 
Although establishment of minimum standards for living space 
in multiple-family dwellings has traditionally been a feature of state 
or municipal housing codes, zoning ordinances have sometimes been 
used to establish such standards for single-family dwellings. Each 
time such standards have been challenged in Michigan they have 
been held invalid,135 but not invalid per se. In each case, the mini-
mums were so high as to make it clear that they bore no reasonable 
relation to public health or safety and that they were designed solely 
to compel construction of larger and more expensive houses.136 
133. Roll v. City of Troy, 370 Mich. 94, 120 N.W.2d 804 (1963); Christine Bldg. Co. 
v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W .2d 816 (1962). , 
134. Judge Adams dissenting in Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, supra note 133. 
135. Elizabeth Lake Estates v. Waterford Township, 317 Mich. 359, 26 N.W.2d 788 
(1947); Frischkorn Constr. Co. v. Redford Township, 315 Mich. 556, 24 N.W.2d 209 
(1946); Senefsky v. Huntington Woods, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N.W.2d 387 (1943). 
136. In Elizabeth Lake Estates v. Waterford Township, supra note 135, only five 
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In Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township,187 however, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court sustained a zoning ordinance which re-
quired not less than 768 square feet for a one-story dwelling, a mini-
mum of one thousand square feet for a two-story dwelling having an 
attached garage, and twelve hundred square feet for a two-story 
dwelling not having an attached garage. The court took "notice 
without formal proof that there are minimums in housing below 
which one may not go without risk of impairing the health of those 
who dwell therein" and concluded that the minimum space require-
ments of the ordinance were reasonable since they were not large for 
a family of normal size and were necessary to prevent the erection 
of shanties, which would deteriorate land values generally. The de-
cision thus rests partly upon considerations of public health and 
partly upon a broad concept of the general welfare taking into ac-
count the effect of substandard dwellings upon property values. 
Although the decision has been vigorously criticized as uphold-
ing "snob zoning" and encouraging "economic segregation" in hous-
ing,188 the present writer is in agreement with those who believe that 
it was clearly justified on public health grounds139 so far as the 768 
square foot minimum is concerned. But the one thousand and the 
twelve hundred square foot requirements for two story houses must 
be justified, if at all, by reference to property values and aesthetic 
considerations.140 Whether aesthetic considerations may properly 
play a paramount role in zoning is, of course, a most controversial 
question. 
5. Aesthetic Considerations in Zoning 
Despite the obvious connection between appearance of structures 
and conservation of property values, courts have been slow to accept 
the view that zoning regulations may serve the general welfare when 
based entirely or mainly on aesthetic considerations. The position of 
the Michigan Supreme Court is still accurately reflected in the fol-
hundred square feet on the first floor level was required, but ten thousand cubic feet 
over all was required; in Frischkorn Constr. Co. v. Redford Township, supra note 135, 
only eight hundred square feet of floor space on the first floor level was required, but 
fourteen thousand cubic feet over all was required; and in Senefsky v. Huntington 
Woods, supra note 135, thirteen hundred square feet of usable floor space was required. 
137. 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). 
138. See Haar, Wayne Township-Zoning for Whom?-ln Brief Reply, 67 HARV. L. 
REv. 986 (1954); Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards-The Wayne Township Case, 66 
HARV. L. REv. 1051 (1953). 
139. Nolan &: Horack, How Small a House?-Zoning for Minimum Space Require-
ments, 67 HARv. L. REv. 967 (1954). 
140. See concurring opinion of Judge Jacobs in Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne 
Township, 10 N.J. 165, 176, 89 A.2d 693,698 (1952). 
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lowing statement: " 'Aesthetics may be an incident but cannot be the 
moving factor,' in determining the validity of building restrictions 
under the police power."141 It seems likely, however, that the present 
Michigan court would accept the use of zoning to control billboard 
advertising, despite the fact that the basis for such control is largely 
aesthetic.142 It also seems likely that the court would sustain zoning 
controls designed to achieve aesthetic objectives in historic areas and 
in areas of substantial scenic importance.143 
No doubt adherence to the generally accepted formula that 
the police power cannot be used to accomplish purely aesthetic ob-
jectives is based largely upon healthy judicial skepticism as to the 
possibility of framing reasonable and generally acceptable aesthetic 
standards.144 But the difficulty of formulating proper standards has 
not prevented the development of an increasingly friendly attitude 
toward zoning based on aesthetic considerations by the New Jersey 
courts.1411 Recently, the New Jersey Appellate Division approved the 
"intangible but ... respectable [zoning] objective of community 
attractiveness"146 and has also said that "no doubt under present-day 
zoning concepts, and in an appropriate factual setting, a zoning or-
dinance may properly bring into play aesthetic considerations in 
regulating the use of property."m And, very recently, the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance provision completely 
prohibiting outdoor advertising signs other than those related to a 
business conducted on the premises.148 The majority opinion empha-
sized the close relationship between aesthetics and other proper ob-
jectives of zoning, especially in "areas where aesthetics and econom-
ics coalesce, areas in which a discordant sight is as hard an economic 
fact as an annoying odor or sound."149 
14-1. Frischkorn Constr. Co. v. Redford Township Bldg. Inspector, 315 Mich. 556, 
563, 24 N.W.2d 209, 212 (1946). 
142. See General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 
149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936). 
143. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955) 
(advisory opinion). 
144. Most of the aesthetic controls actually tried in various communities inspire little 
confidence. See AM. INsr. OF .ARCHITECIS 8: AM. INsr. OF PLANNERS, PLANNING AND 
COMMUNITY APPEARANCE (1958). 
145. See Point Pleasant Beach v. Point Pleasant Pavilion, 3 N.J. Super. 222, 225, 66 
A.2d 40, 41 (App. Div. 1949). See also concurring opinion of Justice Jacobs in Lionshead 
Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 176, 89 A.2d 693, 698 (1952). 
146. Clary v. Borough of Eatontown, 41 N.J. Super. 47, 124 A.2d 54 (App. Div. 1956). 
147. Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh, 55 N.J. Super. 132, 150 A.2d 63 (App. Div. 
1959). 
148. United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 
(1964). 
149. Justice Hall dissented because he thought the prohibition of advertising signs 
was unreasonably discriminatory in excepting "on premise" business signs; but he would 
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6. Regulation of Nonconforming Uses 
Both the New Jersey150 and Michigan151 zoning enabling acts 
affirm the right of a landowner to continue lawful nonconforming 
uses established prior to the adoption of a zoning ordinance. And 
the Michigan and New Jersey courts agree that the right to continue 
a nonconforming use arises only if it is already established and not 
merely contemplated when the zoning restriction becomes effec-
tive, 152 except in cases where a landowner has gained the right to 
initiate a nonconforming use after the effective date of the ordinance 
through having incurred substantial expense in reliance upon a le-
gally issued building permit. In the latter case, the landowner is 
permitted to complete the structure for which the permit was issued 
and to engage in the use for which the structure was designed.153 As a 
general rule, a use must have been completely lawful when the zon-
ing restriction became effective in order to acquire a protected non• 
have gone further than the majority in recognizing aesthetic considerations alone as a 
proper basis for zoning. Id. at 8, 198 A.2d at 450. As indicative of the general trend 
toward greater acceptance of aesthetic considerations as a basis for zoning, see Reid v. 
Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963); State ex rel. 
Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955). Agnor, 
Beauty Begins a Comeback-Aesthetic Considerations in Zoning, 11 J. Pun. L. 260 
(1962); see generally Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives-A Reappraisal, 20 
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955); Comment, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 81 (1964); Comment, 
15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 33 (1963); Comment, 32 u. CINC. L. REv. 367 (1963). 
150. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-48 (1940). 
151. M1cH. CoMP. LAws §§ 125.216 (counties), 125.286 (1948) (townships). 
152. See, e.g., Penning v. Owens, 340 Mich. 355, 65 N.W.2d 831 (1954); Civic Ass'n 
v. Horowitz, 318 Mich. 333, 28 N.W.2d 97 (1947); Pringle v. Shevnock, 309 Mich. 179, 
14 N.W.2d 827 (1944). 
153. See, e.g., De Mull v. Lowell, 368 Mich. 242, ll8 N.W.2d 232 (1962); Sandenburgh 
v. Michigamme Oil Co., 249 Mich. 372, 228 N.W. 707 (1930); Tremarco Corp. v. 
Garzio, 32 N.J. 448, 161 A.2d 241 (1960), and cases cited therein. 
If the landowner has not changed position substantially in reliance on the building 
permit, he acquires no "vested right" to proceed in violation of a subsequently enacted 
zoning ordinance, and the permit may be revoked. A fortiori, a refusal to issue a permit 
for a use that is lawful under the existing ordinance will be upheld if the ordinance is 
properly amended so as to prohibit the intended use before suit is brought to compel 
issuance of the permit. Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. City of Detroit, 368 Mich. 
276, 118 N.W.2d 258 (1962); Lamb v. City of Monroe, 358 Mich. 136, 99 N.W.2d 560 
(1959); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Mount Holly Township, 135 N.J.L. ll2, 51 A.2d 19 
(Sup. Ct. 1947); Tice v. Borough of Woodcliff Lake, 12 N.J. Super. 20, 78 A.2d 825 
(App. Div. 1951). In Michigan the trial judge has discretion to allow amendment of the 
pleadings and pretrial statement to take account of a zoning ordinance or amendment 
enacted after the landowner starts suit to compel issuance of a building permit. Fran-
chise Realty Interstate Co. v. City of Detroit, supra; \Villingham v. City of Dearborn, 
359 Mich. 7, 101 N.W.2d 294 (1960). In New Jersey, on the other hand, an appellate 
court must give superseding effect to any zoning ordinance or amendment adopted in 
the interim between the trial judgment and the appellate determination. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co. v. Mount Holly Township, supra; Roselle v. Borough of Moonachie, 
49 N.J. Super. 35,139 A.2d 42 (App. Div. 1958). 
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conforming status,154 although Michigan appears to follow a de mini-
mis rule in this regard.155 
A lawful nonconforming use carries with it a right to customary 
accessory uses.156 In New Jersey, however, the zoning statute does not 
authorize the local legislative body to allow any extension of a non-
conforming use, and the courts have generally been quite hostile to 
any extension or enlargement.157 The only exception is when the 
nonconforming use consists of quarrying or removing sand and 
gravel from a tract only a portion of which was utilized for that pur-
pose when the zoning restriction became effective.158 A substantial 
increase in the volume of trade or business conducted as a noncon· 
forming use is generally permissible, so long as the character of the 
use is unchanged and substantially the same facilities are used.159 
In Michigan, of course, since the zoning statutes expressly au-
thorize the local legislative body to provide for extension of non-
conforming uses and structures, an authorized extension is valid. 
But when the ordinance does not permit extension of a noncon-
forming use, any extension will be unlawful as contrary to the spirit 
of the zoning statutes.160 
The New Jersey courts have followed the general rule that a 
nonconforming use is protected only if it is substantially the same 
use as that existing when the zoning restriction became effective, 161 
although "a nonconforming use is not restricted to the identical par-
ticular use which was in existence at the time of the enactment of 
154. See, e.g., Drysdale v. Beachnau, 359 Mich. 152, 101 N.W .2d 346 (1960); Town-
ship of West Bloomfield v. Chapman, 351 Mich. 606, 88 N.W .2d 377 (1958); Gross v. 
Allan, 37 N.J. Super. 262, 117 A.2d 275 (App. Div. 1955); Baris Lumber Co. v. Town of 
Secaucus, 20 N.J. Super. 586, 90 A.2d 130 (L. Div. 1952). 
155. "\Ve do not believe that a violation of a provision of a regulatory ordinance 
necessarily destroys the lawfulness of the basic use where compliance with the regula-
tion can be had on demand and where such compliance actually follows." Drysdale v. 
Beachnau, supra note 154, at 155, 101 N.W.2d at 347. 
156. See, e.g., Crompton&: Co. v. Borough of Sea Girt, 1 N.J. Super. 607, 63 A.2d 834 
(L. Div. 1949). 
157. See, e.g., Pieretti v. Town of Bloomfield, 35 N.J. 382, 173 A.2d 296 (1961); Hay v. 
Board of Adjustment, 37 N.J. Super. 461, 117 A.2d 650 (App. Div. 1955); Grundlehner v. 
Dangler, 29 N.J. 256, 148 A.2d 806 (1959); Frank v. Luther, 18 N.J. Super. 193, 87 A.2d 
17 (App. Div. 1952). 
158. Lamb v. McKee, 10 N.J. Misc. 649, 160 Atl. 563 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Moore v. 
Bridgewater Township, 69 N.J. 1, 173 A.2d 430 (1961). 
159. See, e.g., Black v. Town of Montclair, 34 N.J. 105, 167 A.2d 388 (1961); Kramer 
v. Town of Montclair, 33 N.J. Super. 16, 109 A.2d 292 (App. Div. 1954); Lamb v. 
McKee, supra note 158. 
160. Austin v. Older, 283 Mich. 667, 278 N.W. 727 (1938); Hillsdale v. Hillsdale 
Iron&: Metal Co., 358 Mich. 377, 100 N.W.2d 467 (1959). 
161. See, e.g., North Bergen Township v. Thomas S. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 75 N.J. 
Super. 17, 182 A.2d 137 (App. Div. 1962); Arkam Mach. &: Tool Co. v. Lyndhurst 
Township, 73 N.J. Super. 528, 180 A.2d 348 (App. Div. 1962); Miller v. Boonton Town-
ship Bd. of Adjustment, 67 N.J. Super. 460, 171 A.2d 8 (App. Div. 1961). 
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the zoning ordinance."162 In borderline cases, the change in use is 
usually disapproved in New Jersey,163 pursuant to the state's general 
policy of restricting nonconforming uses in the hope that they will 
gradually be eliminated. 
Michigan, however, expressly authorizes ordinances providing 
for substitution of nonconforming uses of structures.164 Under this 
broad statutory authority, Michigan zoning ordinances often pro-
vide either that a change is permitted (a) only to uses in a "higher" 
(more restrictive) classification, or (b) to uses in the same or a 
"higher" classification, often with a further provision that the Board 
of Appeals must approve such changes.165 Even where the zoning 
ordinance makes no provision for substitution of another noncon-
forming use, the Michigan Supreme Court has twice166 held that 
substitution of a less objectionable use, not involving any structural 
changes or additions, must be permitted because, "if the ordinance 
is construed so as to prevent such a use ... it is not reasonable."167 
But the Michigan court has been willing to recognize the statutory 
power of the local legislative body to prohibit any structural altera-
tions in a building devoted to a nonconforming use, even when such 
alterations are necessary for the continuance of the nonconforming 
use.1as 
Neither immediate termination of a nonconforming use nor ter-
mination after an amortization period can be compelled under the 
Michigan or New Jersey zoning statutes.169 But, in view of the sus-
tained hostility of the New Jersey courts toward nonconforming uses, 
one would expect the courts to be astute in finding that termination 
162. Arkam Mach. &: Tool Co. v. Lyndhurst Township, supra note 161, at 5!12, 180 
A.2d at 351. 
163. Grundlehner v. Dangler, 29 N.J. 256, 148 A.2d 806 (1959); Heagen v. Borough 
of Allendale, 42 N.J. Super. 472, 127 A.2d 181 (App. Div. 1956). 
164. MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 125.216, 125.286 (1948). 
165. E.g., ANN ARBOR, MICH., CoDE ch. 55, § 5.86(1) (196!1) provides: "A non-conform-
ing use may be continued and shall be maintained in good condition, but it shall not 
be: (a) Changed to another non-conforming use, except, after approval of the Zoning 
Board of Appeals, to those permitted uses which are contained in the Zoning District 
wherein the non-conforming use first appears in the SCHEDULE OF USE REGULA-
TIONS. Before granting such approval, the Board shall determine that such change in 
use will have a less detrimental effect on neighboring property than the existing non-
conforming use." 
166. Palmer v. City of Detroit, 306 Mich. 449, 11 N.W.2d 199 (194!1); Redford Moving 
&: Storage Co. v. City of Detroit, 336 Mich. 702, 58 N.W.2d 812 (1952). 
167. Palmer v. City of Detroit, supra note 166, at 455-56, 11 N .W .2d at 202. This 
statement was repeated in Redford M. &: S. Co. v. City of Detroit, supra note 166. 
168. Cole v. City of Battle Creek, 298 Mich. 98, 298 N.W. 393 (1941); Austin v. 
Older, 283 Mich. 667,278 N.W. 727 (1938). ANN. ARBoR, MICH., CODE ch. 55, § 5.86(l)(b) 
(1963), prohibits structural alteration "so as to prolong the life of the building." 
169. De Mull v. Lowell, 368 Mich. 242, 118 N.W.2d 232 (1962); United Advertising 
Corp. v. Borough of Raritan·, 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952). 
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by abandonment has occurred. Yet it has been held that non-use of 
premises for three and one-half years because of inability to obtain a 
tenant did not amount to abandonment;170 that closing down a retail 
lumber yard for three years because of financial difficulties did not 
constitute abandonment;171 and that periods of interruption of the 
nonconforming use of a building as a hotel because of financial diffi-
culties engendered by the depression, inability to obtain a tenant, 
and war-time exigencies, did not amount to abandonment.172 More-
over, an ordinance provision that discontinuance of a nonconform-
ing use for a period of one year shall preclude resumption of the use 
has been held to violate the zoning enabling act.173 In Michigan, on 
the other hand, the content of the abandonment doctrine is not yet 
clear. 
III. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
The experience of the Michigan and New Jersey courts with zon-
ing during the past four decades has resulted in some striking con-
trasts. In general, the New Jersey courts have recognized and applied 
a strong presumption that zoning regulations are valid; and they 
have increasingly recognized that zoning is properly a tool for regu-
lation of land use in accordance with a community development 
plan and that the reasonableness of particular zoning regulations as 
applied to particular tracts of land depends very largely upon their 
relevance to the community's development plan, if any. The Mich-
igan courts, on the other hand, have generally given less weight to 
the oft-stated presumption of validity; until quite recently, they have 
largely ignored the role of zoning as a land-use planning tool and 
have been inclined to ignore the community's land use plan and the 
purposes it is designed to serve. Consequently, the Michigan courts 
have tended to act as "super-zoning commissions" to a far greater 
extent than have the New Jersey courts. Whether Padover v. Farm-
ington Township represents a definite and permanent reversal of atti-
tude in these respects still remains to be seen.174 
Although this ·writer, generally speaking, favors the New Jersey 
approach with regard to the matters mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph, it is arguable that the New Jersey Supreme Court has car-
170. Campbell v. South Plainfield Bd. of Adjustment, 118 N.J.L. 116, 191 Atl. 742 
(Sup. Ct. 1937). 
171. National Lumber Prods. Co. v. Ponzio, lll3 N.J.L. 95, 42 A.2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 
1945). 
172. Haulenbeck v. Borough of Allenhurst, 136 N.J.L. 557, 57 A.2d 52 (1948). 
173. State v. Acera, 36 N.J. Super. 420, 116 A.2d 203 (App. Div. 1955). 
174. Cf. text accompanying notes 100-02 supra. 
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ried the presumption of validity too far in validating such regula-
tions as the one requiring five-acre minimum lots in the major por-
tion of an undeveloped rural community175 and the one completely 
excluding trailer parks from a large, relatively undeveloped rural 
township.176 In cases of these types, it may well be preferable to re-
verse the usual presumption of validity and to place upon the mu-
nicipality the burden of showing that the zoning regulation is rea-
sonable.177 This would be consistent with the traditional attitude of 
the Michigan courts toward exclusionary zoning. 
The New Jersey courts have now fully accepted municipal fiscal 
planning as a proper consideration in the framing of a zoning ordi-
nance.178 Michigan courts have not. To the ·writer, the New Jersey 
position seems preferable. There is no doubt that the rapid migra-
tion from central cities to suburban and exurban communities poses 
very difficult problems. New schools, streets, and sewers are required. 
More police and firemen must be employed. New recreation areas 
are needed. Unfortunately, new housing on small lots does not "pay 
its way" (i.e., it does not increase the assessed value of the real estate 
enough to yield the taxes necessary to offset the additional expense 
to the community for new schools and other facilities). Older resi-
dents must pay a higher tax bill at the very time when their way of 
life, in many cases, is drastically altered by the influx of new resi-
dents. Furthermore, construction of new schools and other commu-
nity facilities in a hurried and haphazard manner may have serious 
adverse effects upon the health and safety of the community, in addi-
tion to being uneconomical and wasteful. It therefore seems proper 
to attempt through zoning to achieve a planned, orderly, and bal-
anced growth without a confiscatory increase in the local tax rate. 
Although Padover179 perhaps points toward increased judicial ac-
ceptance of municipal fiscal planning as a proper zoning considera-
tion in Michigan, an amendment of the Michigan zoning statutes 
to compel such acceptance would seem to be in order. In addition, 
the Michigan and New Jersey zoning statutes ought to be amended 
to provide that, before a zoning ordinance or any substantial amend-
ment thereto can be adopted, there must be a map of present land 
175. Fisher v. Bedminster Township, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952). Cf. text 
accompanying notes 128-32 supra. 
176. Vickers v. Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962). 
177. This was suggested by Justice Hall in his dissent in Vickers v. Gloucester 
Township, supra note 175, at 259, 181 A.2d at 144. It has also been suggested in a 
perceptive law review comment dealing with "acreage" zoning. Comment, 106 U. PA. 
L. R.Ev. 292 (1957). 
178. See, e.g., Gruber v. Raritan Township, 39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d 489 (1962). 
179. 132 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. 1965). 
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uses and that the planning board or commission or governing body, 
as the case may be, must have adopted a land use plan containing 
provisions for the future development of the community.180 Indeed, 
the writer would like to see legislation adopted requiring that land 
use planning for metropolitan regions be carried out either at the 
state or regional level, and requiring municipal (and county) zoning 
ordinances to comply therewith. Such a requirement would give 
some real meaning to the concept that zoning should be in accord-
ance with a "comprehensive plan" and would provide an additional 
check upon arbitrary or exclusionary exercise of the zoning power. 
The New Jersey courts have gone much farther than the Mich-
igan courts in recognizing aesthetic objectives as proper considera-
tions in zoning.181 Perhaps the Michigan Supreme Court's attitude 
toward aesthetic considerations will evolve in the same direction as 
the New Jersey Supreme Court's. But it might well be desirable to 
amend the zoning statutes in both states to provide for the inclusion 
of "community appearance regulations" in zoning ordinances, in 
recognition of the legitimacy and importance of aesthetic considera-
tions in zoning.182 
The writer would also like to see both Michigan and New Jersey 
180. The proposed New Local Land Use Law, prepared by the County and Munic-
ipal Law Revision Commission of New Jersey, contains the following provision: 
"Every municipality may, by ordinance, adopt zoning requirements and stan-
dards for the use of land within its borders •.. provided that it has first adopted a 
land use plan, and there is in existence a map of present land uses, and that all of 
the provisions of the proposed zoning ordinance are either substantially consistent 
with such map or are designed to effectuate such plan or a preliminary stage 
thereof. 
• • • 
"Every zoning ordinance adopted prior to the effective date of this chapter shall 
continue in full force and effect and every such zoning ordinance may be amended 
without compliance with the requirements of this section, provided such amend-
ment does not alter the boundaries of an existing zone, and provided, further, 
that such amendment does not make a substantial change in the permitted uses 
within any existing zone." (Proposed new N.J. REv. STAT.§ 40A:7-38.) 
181. See, e.g., United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. I, 198 
A.2d 447 (1964). 
182. The proposed new Local Land Use Law of New Jersey states, inter alia, that 
one of the purposes of the law is to "promote improved community appearance 
through good civic design and arrangement." (Proposed N.J. REv. STAT. § 40A:7-2.) It 
further provides: 
"After the adoption of a zoning ordinance which contains community appear-
ance regulations denominated as such in the ordinance, the governing body 
shall appoint an advisory committee of at least 3 persons, none of whom shall be 
a member of the board of adjustment. 'Where such a community appearance 
advisory committee exists, the board of adjustment shall not act on any appeal or 
application for relief from the community appearance regulations until it had 
referred such appeal or application to. the community advisory committee and 
has received a written report thereon or 30 days shall have elapsed from date 
of referral without such a report having been filed. A duly authorized representa-
tive of the community appearance advisory committee shall be considered a party 
in interest at any hearing before the board of adjustment involving regulations 
affecting community appearance." (Proposed N.J. REv. STAT. § 40A:7-57.) 
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eliminate statutory protection of nonconforming uses and empower 
municipalities to impose reasonable requirements for their termina-
tion.183 There is no reason to suppose such requirements violate the 
federal due process clause, and the current trend in the state courts 
is to sustain reasonable provisions for termination of nonconforming 
uses if the zoning enabling acts do not prohibit this.184 
183. A number of states now have zoning statutes which authorize termination of 
nonconforming uses. See Katarincic, Elimination of Non-Conforming Uses, Buildings, 
and Structures by Amortization-Concept v. Law, 2 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1 (1963). The 
proposed new Local Land Use Law of New Jersey provides: 
"Any municipality may, by zoning ordinance, provide that any of the follow• 
ing nonconforming uses, structures or activities in any district zoned for residential 
use shall cease or be converted to a conforming use. The municipality shall 
provide a reasonable formula, including amortization of investment in the 
property, to determine the period within which such nonconforming use shall 
cease or be converted to a conforming use, but in no event shall such period 
exceed 5 years: 
"a. any such nonconforming use involving the use of land only or involving the 
use of land and accessory improvements which aggregate an assessed valuation for 
tax purposes of not more than $2,000; 
"b. any such nonconforming use consisting of a sign or billboard; 
"c. any such nonconforming use consisting of a junk yard, auto wrecking or 
dismantling establishment. 
"Such ordinance shall provide that the board of adjustment or an appropriate 
official designated therein shall select the use or uses to be eliminated and shall, 
after notice and hearing, compute the time within which such use or uses shall 
be eliminated in accordance with the formula contained in this section and in the 
zoning ordinance. The board or officer shall serve notice on the owner or owners 
of the property in question which notice shall commence the running of the 
period within which such use or uses shall be eliminated." (Proposed N.J. REv. 
STAT. § 40A:7-45.) 
184. See, e.g., Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. Los Angeles County, 43 Cal. 2d 121, 
272 P.2d 4 (1954); Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954); 
Spurgeon v. Board of Comm'rs, 181 Kan. 1008, 317 P.2d 798 (1957); Harbison v. City of 
Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958); People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 
34 (1952). 
For general discussion of nonconforming uses, see Anderson, The Nonconforming 
Use-A Product of Euclidean Zoning, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 214 (1959); Katarincic, 
supra note 182; Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures, 20 I.Aw & 
CoNTEMP. PROB. 305 (1955); Comment, 30 IND. L.J. 521 (1955); Comment, 26 U. CHL L. 
REv. 442 (1959); Comment, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 91 (1953). 
